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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JAMES SICILIANO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WE S T E R N RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9378 
BRIEF OF AP'P'ELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff instituted this suit under the provisions of 
the Federal Employers Liability Act to recover damages 
for an eye injury alleged to have been sustained on Sep-
tember 8, 1952. The case "ras tried before a jury in 
October, 1960. Prior to commencement of the trial, de-
fendant demanded and the court called a special venire. 
During the course of the selection of the jury from the 
special panel, the court on its own motion and without 
legal cause excused two of the proposed jurors. The 
parties put on their evidence and the defendant moved 
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the court for a directed verdict. The court denied defend-
ant's Inotion and the jury re,turned a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff. Damages \vere assessed at $30,000 and 
diminished by $7,500 by reason of plaintiff's own negli-
gence. Judgment was entered on the verdict. Defendant's 
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
for new trial were denied. This appeal challenges the 
judgment below on the grounds that the court erred in 
denying the defendant's motions for directed verdict, for 
judgment n.o.v. and for new trial and committed pre-
judicial error in arbritrarily excusing qualified jurors 
from the special panel and in instructing the jury. 
STA·TEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 8, 1952, the plaintiff, James Siciliano, 
was working as a machinist in the defendant's shops in 
Salt Lake City. Siciliano and a fello\v employee, Bob 
Wells, had been working in a drop pit, taking do\vn a 
spring rigging on a railroad locomotiYe. In the course 
of their work, Wells required a piece of wire so that he 
could tie back a brake bean1. ,,~ells asked Siciliano to 
go and get a roll of \vire that he had seen hanging on a 
post about 20 to 30 feet fron1 \vhere they \vere \vorking. 
The accident occurred when Sieiliano took the \vire fro1n 
the post. 
Siciliano was the only \\Titness to the accident. The 
wire (Exhibit D-1) consisted of a roll about 8 to 10 inches 
in diameter. It \Ya~ hanging over a nail on a post just 
above the level of Siciliano's head. The shop was ,veil 
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lit and Siciliano could clearly see what he was doing. 
Siciliano claimed that as he took the wire from the nail 
with his right hand it flipped and that a loose end pene-
trated his eye causing the eye injury (R. 99). The major 
dispute in the evidence arises as to the manner in which 
the wire was removed from the post. On direct examina-
tion, Siciliano said (R. 99) : 
"I ltfted it up and all at once it sprung on 
my eye. I lifted it up with my right hand and I 
dropped the wire when it hit my eye ... " 
On cross examination he said (R. 114): 
''I just grabbed it." 
In furnishing a report of the accident to the Railroad 
Company, he said (Ex. D-2) : 
"As I pulled wire off post it flipped in my 
eye.'' 
4
'I did not know the wire would flip when I 
jerked it from the post." 
In the same report Siciliano indicated that he blamed 
no one for the accident. 
Siciliano related the circumstances of the accident 
to his foreman, Paul Schenk, on the day following the 
accident. As to this Schenk testified (R. 183): 
''Well, he said he needed a piece of wire and 
went to this post, gave it a jerk, and a piece of 
it hit him in the eye.'' 
During cross examination of Siciliano, he was asked by 
counsel if he had told Schenk that he "jerked" the wire 
from the post. He replied (R. 121): 
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"I don't remember whether I told him I 
jerked it or not." 
Plaintiff took the position, of course, that the wire had 
been "lifted" and not "jerked" fron1 the post. 
In defendent's shop employees were instructed to 
pick up wire or other materials froin the floor, and in 
the case of usable wire, to hang the same on posts within 
the shop· so that it might be used in the work of the shop 
(R. 185). The men were not instructed to wind the end 
of the roll in such a way as to bind it to the rest of the 
roll thereby preventing use of the \Yire before unraveling 
and straightening of the ends (R. 185). 
Defendant offered testimony concerning the custom 
and practice of hanging usable wire on posts in the 
working area of local shops where it \vas readily available 
for use by employees in the course of their work. The 
plant superintendent of a local shop doing heavy indus-
trial work testified that at the time of the accident it 
was the custom and practice to hang usable wire over 
hooks on posts located in the working areas. In the shop 
where this witness was employed, Structural Steel and 
Forge ·Company, there "~ere 50 to 100 hooks used for 
just that purpose (R. 196-198). It \Yas not the practice 
to tie the ends of loops of \\'"ire placed on these posts. 
The witness stated: 
"We never tie then1" ( R. 198). 
Defendant also called a master mechanic employed 
with the Southern Pacific Railroad. The witness was 
familiar with the defendant's shop where the accident 
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occurred and was employed in the Southern Pacific shops 
in Ogden at the time of the accident. It was the custom 
and practice in the Southern Pacific shops to hang usable 
wire on posts \vhere employees could obtain it. This was 
done on posts located throughout the shop and the ends 
of the \Vires were not tied down (R. 199, 200). 
There was no evidence as to any practice of tying 
the ends of rolls of wire. 
Although the jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff, they found, as disclosed by their verdict, that the 
plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence which was a 
proximate· cause of the accident (R. 62). 
The defendant moved the court for a directed verdict 
at the close of plaintiff's case and again when defendant's 
evidence was in (R. 174, 175, 201, see also R. 10, 11). 
The basis of the motions was that there was no competent 
evidence of negligence on the part of defendant and that 
if there was any negligence which resulted in plaintiff's 
alleged injury it was solely the negligence of the plaintiff 
himself. The court denied these motions. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S l\[OTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
AND FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V. 
(a) There is no evidence of negligence on the part 
of the defendant. 
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(b) The negligence of the plaiutiff in jerkin[J the 
w~re from the post was the sole proxtmate 
cause of the accident. 
POINT II. 
TI-IE ·COURT COM~1:ITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERR.OR IN ARB IT R A R I L Y EXCUSING 
QUALIFIED Jl"rRORS FRO~[ THE SPE·CIAL 
PANEL. 
POINT III. 
T HE COURT COM~1ITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GI\TING IKSTRUCTIOX NO. 7 
vVHICH IN SUBSTA~~CE AND EFFECT IN-
STRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT HAD A DUTY TO ELIMINATE THE 
·CONDITION WITH WHICH THE JURY WAS 
CONCERNED. 
POI~T rv·. 
T HE COl~RT C0~11IITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING IXSTRl"'"CTION NO. 16 
WHI·CH IN SUBSTA:\CE .A.XD EFFECT 
AUTI-IORIZED RECOVERY BY THE PLAIN-
TIFF EVEN TH0llt1H HIS XEGLIGEXCE 
WAS THE SOLE ·CAUSE OF THE """\CCIDENT 
1\XD }~\·I~~N THOUGH DEFEXD"""\XT'S XEGLI-
GENCE WAS NOT A PROXI~I"""\TE CAUSE OF 
THE AC·CIDENT. 
POINT V. 
TI-IE TRIAL COURT C()j[\LITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
6 INVOLVING AN ISSUE NOT PRESENTED 
BY THE PLEADINGS OR THE EVIDEN·CE 
AND NOT BEFORE THE COURT OR THE 
JURY. 
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POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL (~0l~l{11 COJ\[:\llTTED PREJUDI-
(~L.\l.J ERROR IN REFUSlXG TO GIVE DE-
FEND1\Nri1'H l~l~~(~ l ~ 1~Srfll1~D INSTRUCTIONS 
N<>~. 6 AND 11 \\Tl-liCH WOULD HAVE DI-
RECTED rcl-fE ~JURY THAT IN DETER1\1:IN-
IXG \YIII~~rl1 iiER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT 
,,~_.\S NEGLIGENT THEY SHOULD TAKE IN-
TO CONSIDERATION THAT DEFE~DANT 
HAD THE RIGEIT TO Af--;S1 1~TE THAT ITS 
11~~Il>LOYEES WOULD EXERCISE REASON-
ABLE CARE FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY. 
POINT. VII. 
A GROSS A ,V.ARD OF $30,000 FOR PLAIN-
TIFF'S .AJjLEGED INJURY IS SO EX·CES-
SI\~1~ lTXDER THE CIRCUMSTAN·C·Es OF 
THIS CASE AS TO CO,MPEL THE CONCLU-
SION THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED 
BY PASSION AND PREJUDI·CE IN ASSESS-
ING DAMAGES AND THE TRIAL ·C·OURT 
COl\I~fiTTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DE-
NYING DEFEXDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL BY REASON OF EXCESSIVE 
D.AJ.I ... ~GES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
AXT 'S 1\IOTIOXS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
AND FOR ~Jl~DG~IENT N.O.V. 
Liability under the Federal Employers Liability Act 
arises from negligence and not from a mere showing of 
injury. Further, it must be shown that the negligence 
'vas the cause of the injury. It is still the function of 
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the state trial and ap·p·ellate judges to determine when 
the evidence is sufficient to justify submssion to a jury 
on the issues of negligence and proximate cause. The 
United States Supreme Court, though very solicitous of 
the role of the jury in F.E.L.A. cases, has not stripped 
the court of its right and duty to determine whether 
or not a jury question exists. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in 
his concurring opinion in Wi:lkerson v. l.~lcCarthy, 336 
U. S. 53, 69 Sup'. Ct. 413, said: 
"The easy but timid way out for a trial judge 
is to leave all cases tried to a jury for jury de-
termination, but in so doing he fails in his duty 
to take a case from the jury when the evidence 
would not warrant a verdict by it. A timid judge, 
like a biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless 
judge. 
"These observations are especially pertinent 
to suits under the Federal Employers Liability 
Act." 
The observation, of course, is equally pertinent at the 
app~ellate level. 
Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 64 Sup. Ct. 
232, states the prevailing rule in F.E.L.A. cases with 
respect to proof of negligence and proximate cause. In 
that case the plaintiff obtained a judginent for the death 
of her husband. The Supreme Court of North Carolina 
reversed the judgment and the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Reed for the 1najority of the 
court said: 
"The weight of the evidence under the Em-
ployers Liability Act must be more than a scintilla 
before the case may be prop,erly left to the dis-
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cretion of the trier of fact - in this case, the 
jury. (Citing cases) When the evidence is such 
that without "\Veighing the credibility of the wit-
nesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion 
as to the verdict, the court should determine the 
proceeding by non-suit, directed verdict or other-
wise in accordance with the applicable p-ractice 
\vithout submission to the jury, or by judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. By such direetion of 
the trial the result is saved from the mischance 
of speculation over legally unfounded claims. 
(Citing cases) ... The rule as to when a directed 
verdict is p.roper, heretofore referred to, is ap~pli­
cable to questions of proximate cause (Citing 
cases). . . . L~ability arises from negligence not 
from injttt~ry under this Act. And that negligence 
must be the cause of the injury (Citing cases)." 
It is therefore still the law and the federal rule that 
juries do not determine liability in F.E.L.A. cases in 
the absence of substantial evidence of negligence on the 
part of the defendant and p~roof that the negligence 
complained of \Yas a proximate cause of the injuries. 
(a) There i;s no evidence of negligence on the part 
of the ,defendant. 
Plaintiff's claim is that he was injured when he 
handled a piece of wire. The evidence discloses that there 
was a roll of \vire with free ends hanging on a post in 
defendant's shops. This was customary and usual in 
defendant's shops and in other shops in the area. We 
submit that there is no permissible inference to be drawn 
from these facts which in any way indicates negligence 
on the part of the Railroad Company. 
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In order to prove negligence on the part of the 
defendant, plaintiff must produce evidence from which 
a jury could reasonably find that the defendant should 
have foreseen the probability that a person handling the 
wire 'vith ordinary prudence and care might sustain 
injury. (Defendant was entitled to assume that the wire 
would be handled by its employees in a careful and pru-
dent manner. Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 litah 583, 17G 
Pac. 267.) 
Plain tiff contended before the trial court that the 
roll of wire constituted a·· trap" or a latent danger. There 
is nothing intrinsically or inherently dangerous in a roll 
of wire. It is one of the most simple items used in the 
industry. This is not to say that a piece of wire, if im-
properly handled, may not strike objects. This may hap-
pen by mishandling at any tilne. It could occur when 
the wire is picked up from the floor: 'Yhen it is placed 
upon or removed from a table or a 'vall or a post; 'Yhen 
it is unrolled for use or when it is actually being placed 
in use. Similarly, pinchers "~in pinch, ha1n1ners 'vill crush~ 
nails 'vill puncture and glass "ill cut if nlishandled. But 
the mere presence of a roll of "ire hanging on a post 
did not present to James Siciliano an •'unreasonable 
risk of harm" and the practice or Inethod of placing "Tire 
with free ends upon posts throughout the shop 'vas not 
'·negligence." 
Proof of an .accident is not proof of negligence nor 
is proof of "'danger" proof of negligence. TT' illia1ns v. 
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Conzpany, 119 Utah 
529, 230 P. 2d 315; Horsley v. Robnison_. 112 lTtah 227, 
186 P. 2d 592. 
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.1\.ssurning, contrary to hwnan experience, that the 
\\ .. irP hanging on the post in defendant's shop \\~as a 
potential source of danger to the plaintiff even had he 
handled it in a careful and prudent manner, plaintiff's 
eontention of negligence overlooks the funda1nental 
proposition that liability to a servant is not predicated 
upon Hdanger" but negligence and that negligence is 
never i1nputed frou1 the employ1nent of methods in gen-
eral use in the, business or industry involved. Ellis v. 
L. & N. R. Co., 251 S.W. 2d 577; Cheffey v. Pennsylvania 
llailroad Company, 79 F. Supp. 252; Prattico v. Hudson 
C01al Con~pany, 341 Pa. 490, 32 Atl. 2d 733. 
The court in Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 222 N.C. 
3G7, 235 S.E. 2d 334, was confronted with the identical 
question posed in this case. There the plaintiff contended 
that the railroad company was negligent in failing to 
provide a light indicating the dangerous position of a 
derailer. There \Yas no custom or practice of placing 
warning lights on derailers. The Supreme Court of North 
·Carolina said: 
'"The fact that there was no light on the small 
target indicating the position of the derailer in 
question under the circumstances of this case, 
would not alone be evidence of negligence, in the 
abse1lce of showing that. placing lights on such 
target 1ras in accord with the general and ap-
proved 'USage." 
The United State8 Supreme Court affirmed the State 
court decision. As to the absence of a light on the de-
railer, the court said (320 U.S. 476, 480, 64 Sup. Ct. 
232,235): 
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"As to the light, it is nowher_e shown tha~ ~t 
was customa;ry or even ,desi·rable tn t~e opera.tton 
of this or .any other railroad to equ'l)p dera1Jlers 
with such a siynal.'' 
Thus, the plaintiff's contention that the defendant was 
negligent in maintaining a derailer without a warning 
light was rejected and the judgment on the jury's verdict 
was set aside. In the case at bar plaintiff has wholly 
failed to show that the method and practice employed 
by the industry or in similar industries was to bind the 
free ends of a roll of wire. The undisputed evidence indi-
cates the contrary. That is, that the prevailing custom 
and usage in the industry is to hang rolls of wire in the 
\vorking areas of industrial shops without binding the 
free ends. There is nothing in this practice which is con-
trary to due regard for the safety of defendant's em-
ployees, and we submit that the defendant was as a 
matter of law not guilty of negligence in follo,ving the 
prevailing custom and practice in this regard. 
Under the doctrine of the Brady case foreseeability 
is still a necessary element of negligence on the part of 
a railroad company. The state court decision in the Brady 
case discussed this element at length and the following 
quotation from this opinion represents a general sum-
mary of the law as it now stands : 
"Where the duty to guard against injury to 
others grows out of certain relationships and cir-
cumstances, breach of such duty i1nposes respon-
sibility for consequences '"·hich are probable and 
which could reasonably have been foresee~ ac-
cqrding to ordinary and_ usual experience,' bu.t 
not for consequences ~vh~·ch .are me·rely possible 
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~accordiug to occasional experience. Stone v. 
Boston l\: A. R. Co., 171 Mass. 536, 51 N .E. 1, 41 
L.R.A. 7~-1-. • The rttle is that one is bound to antici-
pate those consequences of his negligent act or 
o1n-ission. u·hich in the ordinary course of human 
experi'ence, IHight reasonably be expecte1d to re-
sult tlterefront.' 38 Am. Jur., 710. Foreseeability is 
a necessary element in actionable negligence, and 
111ust be made to appear before liability can be 
imposed for the consequences of a wrongful act 
or omission. This principile was stated in Osborne 
v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 207 N.C. 545, 177 S.E. 
796, as follows: 'The law only requires reasonable 
foresight, and when the injury complained of is 
not reasonably foreseeable, in the exercise of due 
care, the party \\?hose conduct is under investiga-
tion is not answerable therefor.' This statement 
of the la-\v has been frequently cited with approval, 
and the principle applied in numerous cases. But-
ner v. Spease, 217 N:C. 82, 6 S.E. 2d 808; Guthrie 
v. Gocking, 21-! N.C. 513, 199 S.E. 707; Newell 
v. Darnell, 209 N.C. 254, 183 S.E. 374; Beach v. 
Patton, 208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446. Justice Car-
dozo, in Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
22-! N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 88, 13 A.L.R. 875, ex-
pressed the same idea in these words : 'The wrong-
doer may be charged with those consequences and 
those only within the range· of prudent foresight.' 
In ~Iilwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 
U. S. 469, 475, 24 L.Ed. 256, it was that 'it must 
appear that the injury was the natural and prob-
able consequence of the negligence or wrongful 
act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in the 
light of the attending circumstances.' From Stone 
v. Boston & A. R. Co. [171 Mass. 536, 51 N.E. 3, 
41 L.R.A. 794], supra, we quote, 'One ~s bound to 
anticipate and prov~de ~against what 'Hsu.ally hap-
pens and 1rhat is likely to happen; but it would 
impose too heavy a responsib~l~ty to hold him 
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bound in like manner to guard against what is 
unusual and tttnlikely to happen, or what, .as it is 
sometin~es sa~d, is only remotely and slightly prob-
able.' Snyder v. Colorado Springs & ·C. C. D. R. 
Co., 36 Colo. 288, 85 P. 686, 8 L.R.A., N".S., 781, 
118 Am. St. Rep .. 110. 
'' 'The substance of it all, stated and restated 
in various ways is that negligence carriJes wi-th it 
liability for consequences which, in the light of 
attendant circumstances, could reasonably have 
been antvcip.ated by a pru.dent man, but not for 
casualties which, though possible, were wholly iln-
probable. One is not charged with foreseeing that 
which could not be expecte.d to happen.' Wyatt v. 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 158 ,---a. 470, 163 
S.E. 370, 373, 82 A.L.R. 386." 
The accident "\vhich occurred in this case was a freak 
accident. Plaintiff recognizes this as evidenced by his 
requested instructions ( R. 19). It "\vas not one "\vhich 
n1ight be expected in the ordinary course of hmnan ex-
perience. Although the plaintiff could foresee no injury 
from the handling of the "ire (R. 119, 120), he expects 
the Railroad Company to be clairvoyant in this regard. 
\\T e know of no other court case or experience of railroad 
comp~anies indicating a similar occurance. To require the 
defendant to foresee this accident or to foresee harm to 
the plaintiff is to impose liability "~ithout fault. 
The practical side of the judg1nent below is to make 
the Railroad Company an insurer of the safety of it~ 
employees while they are handling "\Yire. \\~''ire is neces-
sary in the operation of a railroad shop, and if men are 
to perform their "\vork they n1ust handle it. If "ire is to 
be used, it must be handled "\vith the ends free. It can-
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not be eu1ployed in u~l} until the- ends are free. It makes 
absolutely no difference \vhether the \\"ire is placd on a 
flat surfaee or hung on a vertical surface. There is just 
no '"reason" in a finding that the defendant was negli-
gent because a piece of \vire \vith free ends was hanging 
on a post in its shops. If the key word in the area of 
negligence la\v is ••reasonable" as we understand it to 
be, \\re respectfully submit that the judgment below must 
be set aside, for a finding that the defendant was guilty 
of actionable negligence under the circumstances of this 
case simply does not comport with reason or with justice 
and fairness under the law. 
(b) The negligence of the plaintiff in jerking the 
u''ire from the post was the sole proximate 
cause of the accident. 
The defendant contends that the plaintiff was negli-
gent in jerking or pulling the wire from the post. This 
was the contention in the court below; this was the theory 
of the defendant's cross examination of the plaintiff, and 
of its argument to the jury. ·This is the only respect in 
\Yhich the evidence \Vas in conflict. The jury found that 
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence and diminished 
the a\vard accordingly (R. 62). This necessarily amounts 
to .a finding that the plaintiff jerke-d or p~ulled the wire 
from the post. This mishandling of the wire was the 
sole cause of the accident. 
The defendant had no duty to anticipate that the 
plaintiff \vould jerk the \\"ire from the post. The Brady 
case, supra, is closely analogous in this respect. Plain-
tiff's decedent had been killed in a derailment and p~lain-
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tiff urged inter alia that a defective rail was the canst~ 
' ' of the accident. Evidence of experts disclosed that the 
rail on which defendant's car was riding was "so worn 
on top· and sides that ... it permitted the thrust of the 
east wheels of the car, as they rose over the 'wrong end' 
of the derailer, to force the flange on the west wheels 
over the defective rail and so to derail the cars." The 
evidence also disclosed that in the absence of such 
defective condition no derailn1ent \vould have occurred 
"nine times out of ten." There was, ho,vever, no evidence 
of the unsuitability of the rail for ordinary use. The 
United States Sup·reme Court, in holding that the de-
fendant railroad company had no duty to anticipate 
that the cars would be run over the \Vrong end of the 
deraile~r and that the defective rail would thus constitute 
a dangerous condition, said (320 lT.S. 483, ±84, 64 Sup. 
·Ct. 236, 237) : 
~'The Supreme Court of North Carolina [222 
N.C. at page 370, 23 S.E. 2d at page 338] was of 
the view that striking a derailer from the unex-
pected direction '"'"as so unusual, so contrary to 
the purpose' of the derailer that provision to 
guard against such a happening was beyond the 
requirement of due care. With this we agree. 
Bare possibility is not sufficient. Milwaukee, etc., 
R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, at page 475, 2-! 
L. Ed. 256: 'But it is generally held, that, in order 
to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act 
not amounting to wanton wrong, is the proximate 
cause of an injury it must ap~pear that the injury 
was the natural and probable consequence of the 
negligenee or wrongful act, and that it ought to 
have been foreseen in the light of the attending 
circumstanee~·'. Events too remote to require rea-
sonable prevttSton need not be anticvpated. . . . 
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llere the ra~l was sufficient for ordinary use, and 
the car,rier was not obliged to foresee and guard 
against misuse of the derailer, even though the 
1nisuse occurred as oft-en as the ev~dence. indicated. 
It was the wrongful use of the ,deJr.aiiler that im-
Jned~ately occasione,d the harm. Decedent had 
first closed and then opened the derailer on the 
first movement. He signalled the train to back 
into the storage track just before the fatal acci-
dent. Although this misuse of the derailer was 
an act of negligence, it is mere sp,eculation as to 
whether that negligence is chargeable to the de-
cedent or another. Without this unexpected occur-
renrP, the adequacy of the rail vis-a-vis a properly 
used derailer is unquestioned. It was entirely 
disconnected from the earlier act of the carrier 
in placing the weak rail in the track. The mere 
fiact that with a so?md rail the acc~dent m~ght not 
have happened is not enough. The oarrier's neg-
ligence must be a li·nk in an unbroken chaim of 
reasonably foresee1able events." 
It was the wrongful use or mishandling of the wire 
which resulted in plaintiff's injury in this case, and the 
mere fact tha~ this accident might not have occurred 
had the free ends of the wire been bound is not enough 
to charge the defendant with liability. There is no evi-
dence that the wire was not safe for ordinary handling. 
vVe respectfully urge that the only reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from the evidence is that the practice 
of hanging wire on a post with free ends was safe at 
least for ordinary handling. Here, as in the Brady case, 
it was the "wrongful use ... that immediately occasioned 
the harm'' and ~'the carrier is not obliged to foresee and 
guard against misuse.'' 
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'\7 e submit that in this case the record before the 
court demonstrates that the jury found the plaintiff 
negligent in jerking the wire from :the post; that the 
defendant had no legal duty to foresee or anticipate the 
misuse or mishandling of said wire; that the defendant 
in allowing said wire to be placed on the post was not 
guilty of negligence, and that if this accident was caused 
by the negligence of any person, it was the negligence 
of the plaintiff in jerking the wire from the post. F-or 
the reasons above stated, the case should be remanded 
to the district court with instructions to dismiss the 
action. 
POINT II. 
THE ·COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ARBITRARILY EXCUSING 
QUALIFIED JURORS FRO~I THE SPE·CIAL 
PANEL. 
In every F.E.L.A. case defendant is faced with the 
proposition of defending what the public considers to be 
a wealthy corporation against the claim of an employee 
injured in the course of his \Vork. The tendency of many 
jurors is to .award damages \vithout regard to fault. The 
background, experience and integrity of the jurors \vho 
decide these cases are vital. Whether counsel like it or 
not, they are faced in every case \Yith the proposition 
of judging the probable vie,vpoint and attitude of each 
prospective juror. While there may be doubt as to the 
success achieved in this endeavor, the fact is that it is a 
vital part of success in the la\\'"suit. The trial court in 
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thi~ ('HSe explained t hP pro('PSs of peremptory challenges 
to the jur~~ as follows (R. 82) : 
HThey use their own discretion based on what 
t hp~· learned about the jurors, what your knowl-
edgP and experience has been, they weigh your 
ha('kground and place of residence, and anything 
the~T can learn about you, and your other fellow 
jurors, and determine which one can best serve 
and solve the issue in this case. They also deter-
mine your ability to be fair and impartial. That 
is \\·hy \\'"e carry on this little examination." 
In this case the court on its own motion and \vithout 
cause exeused t\vo prospective jurors, Stanton Peck and 
l{a~- ... \. Norton. 
Peck was the fourth juror dra\vn from the name 
box. Ilis address was given .as 1440 Laird Avenue in Salt 
Lake Cit~~, Utah. He was associated with Allsteel Office 
Supply Company. 
Norton gave hls occupation as a job development 
specialist \\Tith the Department of Employment Security. 
His address was listed as 1722 Harvard Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, l~tah. 
The court excused these two jurors after the follow-
ing inquiry (R. 89, 90): 
··THE COURT: (speaking to the jurors) ... 
I would like to have you become acquainted with 
the parties. James Siciliano is the gentleman sit-
ting at the center of the table with the white hair. 
Sitting on his left is ~Ir. l\Ie~Iillan and l\Ir. Beck, 
his attorneys. On Mr. Siciliano's right is Mr. Clif-
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ford Ashton who is raising his hand. He is the 
attorney for The Denver and Rio G:ande ~estern 
Railroad Company. Are you acquainted With any 
of these gentlemen~ 
Mr. Peck-
MR. PECK: I know Mr. McMillan and Mr. 
Beck. 
THE COURT·: Is that a business acquaint-
ance~ 
MR. PECK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do they deal with your busi-
ness~ 
MR. PECK: Just that we have Mr. McMillan 
on the books. 
THE COURT: He is a customer of yours~ 
MR. PE.CK: That is right. 
Peck was thereup·on excused by the court. The court 
then continued (R. 90) : 
Mr. Norton-
~fR. NORTON: I am acquainted with Mr. 
1\IcMillan, in fact we are related. 
THE ·COURT : How close are you related f 
MR. NORTON: Second cousins, his father 
and I are cousins. 
THE COURT: That excuses You the la\v 
. ' 
says those related second cousins or closer have 
a problem, ... " 
Thus Peck and Norton were eliminated as jurors by the 
court. We point out that there was no challenge made 
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by either counsel and that the basis for the court's action 
in each instance was a relationship between the juror 
and counsel. 
In excusing the two jurors, the trial court no doubt 
had in mind Rule -1:7 (f) which gives a litigant the right 
to challcnrJc a juror for cause because of the relationship 
of debtor and creditor or consanguinity existing between 
the juror and a party. There is no rule of law or statute 
in force in this state which disqualifies a juror because 
he is a creditor of or related to counsel. The common 
law· rule is stated in Petcosky v. Bowman, 197 \T a. 240, 
89 S.E. 2d 4: 
"It is well settled that at common law a juror 
is not disqualified by the fact that he is related 
to one of the counsel in the case. (Citing authori-
ties)" 
But even had there been a right to challenge jurors 
Norton and Peck that right existed in favor of the liti-
gants, and the court had no right whatever to arbitrarily 
excuse the jurors. The right to challenge a juror is a 
right which may be waived and in this case had there 
been a right to challenge the jurors for cause said right 
would have existed in favor of the defendant. In the 
case of Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 
Pac. 462, the court stated the rule as follows : 
"The fact that a juror sustains the relation-
ship of debtor or creditor to a party to an action 
does not disqualify the juror to act, but it gives 
the litigant the right to challenge for cause such 
juror." 
This rule \\Tas affirmed in the case of State Bank of 
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Beaver Cownty v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 
612. 
In the case at bar the jurors were excused at the 
direction of the court without motion of either party to 
the suit. Since dismissal of the jurors was n1ade without 
motion, counsel for the defendant had no opportunity 
to object before the jurors were excused. Rule 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that formal ex·-
ceptions to the orders of the court are unnecessary. Rule 
46 further provides that 
"If a party has no opportunity to object to 
a ruling or order at the time it is made, the 
absence of an objection does not thereafter pre-
judice him." 
In this case there was no indication at all before the 
jurors were excused that the court \Yas going to excuse 
the jurors from the panel. Under Rule 46 counsel had 
no duty to tell the court that it had erred or to object 
to that which had already been directed by the judge. 
Counsel was placed in the position of remaining silent 
as he had a right to do under Rule 46 or challenging 
in the p-resence of the jury an order already made by 
the court. It is common thing to take issue "ith opposing 
counsel. This is expected by court and jury alike. To take 
issue with the court at the outset of a la\Ysuit is a dif-
ferent proposition. Under Rule 46 it \Yas not necessary 
for counsel to question an order already made. The error 
IS therefore preserved. 
It is difficult to say \vhat actual effect the two 
jurors might have had on the outco1ne of the case had 
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they been allowed to serve. Notwithstanding any rela-
tionship betwePn the jurors and counsel for the plaintiff, 
the t\\·o 1nen \vho were excused by the court were con-
sidert•d by the defendant to be desirable jurors and the 
defendant \vould not have exercised one of its peremp-
tory ehallenges against either of them. These men were 
both \Yhite-collar office workeTs who each resided in 
a 1niddle or high income residential area of the city. 
Coun8el for defendant are of the impression that the 
experience ordinarily encountered by jurors such as 
X o1'ton and Peck and their position as office workers 
qualify them to decide the issues more impartially than 
the laborer or lo\v income 1nan whose sympathies often 
lie \vith a fellow laborer who has been injured in the 
course of his work. 
It has also been counsel's experience that women 
jurors are often influenced by sympathy and compas-
sion for an injured plaintiff to the point of disregarding 
the i:ssue of liability. In this case the defendant would 
like to have excused the women jurors and particularly 
the juror, Maxine Beck, who bore the same name as on<~ 
of plaintiff's counsel. With its three peren1ptory chal-
lenges, defendant excused other jurors who were felt to 
be more dangerous. However, had the court not excused 
jurors X orton and Peck, the woman juror, Maxine Beck, 
'vould not have been on the jury. (See Jury List- R. 9) 
Counsel for plaintiff makes some interesting sug-
gestions in his affidavit (R. 65-A) 'vith respect to what 
\\Te assume he is urging he would have revealed to the 
court had X orton and Peck not been excused by the 
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trial judge. Nothing in this "belated testimony" of coun-
sel is pertinent in considering the propriety of the dis-
missal of the jurors or the effect thereof. 
·The point, of course, is that the defendant, and the 
defendant alone, had the right to challenge (if there had 
been basis for a challenge) and to decide who it would 
excuse peremptorily. The only legitimate inquiry of the 
trial court was the legal qualifications of the prospective 
jurors. These qualifications were met in the instant case. 
Beyond this, the court had no right to tell either or both 
parties to the lawsuit that a qualified juror would be 
excused and would not serve as a member of the jury 
any more than he could instruct counsel that a specific 
juror must serve on the jury panel. 
The right of counsel to exercise their limited right 
of choice by making their own decisions as to who they 
''rill excuse seems to us to be a basic right in a jury 
trial. If that right is to be preserved, our appellate court 
cannot overlook or disregard interference with the right 
at the trial level. ·Certainly this court cannot say that 
the error 'vas not p.rejudicial. A holding that the ag-
grieved party must show prejudiee "ritl1 certainty in 
cases of this kind simply leaves the litigants with a 
hollow right "'hich 'vhen denied or interfered 'vith can-
not be enforced. 
We respectfully submit that the defendant is en-
titled to try this la,vsuit before a jury empaneled accord-
ing to the statutes and rules of the state courts. 
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POIN'T III. 
T HE COURT CO~l~IITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
\VlliCH IN SUBSTANCE AND EFFE,CT IN-
STRlTl~TED THE JURY THAT THE DEFEND-
1\:KT, HAD A DUTY TO ELIMINATE THE 
·CONDITION WITH WHICH THE JURY WAS 
l 1(>NCERNED. 
By Instruction No. 7 the court instructed the jury 
as follows: 
'·You are instructed that a continuous duty 
exists on the part of a carrier, such as the defend-
ant in this case, to use ordinary care in furnishing 
its employees with a reasonably safe place in 
which to work. This duty does not require the 
absolute elimination of all danger, or hazard, but 
it does req~tiJre the elimi,nation of ,all danger or 
hazard which the exercise of reasonable care could 
rcnzove or guard ~aga~nst, and this applies to the 
condition with which we are concerned. The 
amount of caution required by that duty varies in 
direct proportion to the dangers known to be in-
volved in this work. To put the matter in another 
way, the amount of care required of a railroad 
company in the exercise of ordinary care, to furn-
ish its employees with a reasonably safe place 
within which to work, or safe tools and equip-
ment increases or decreases as do the dangers 
that reasonably should be ap·prehended. Failure 
of the defendant to discharge this duty of using 
reasonable care to provide its employees with a 
safe place in which to work or with safe appli-
ances, equipment or tools for his work would 
constitute negligence." 
Exception was duly taken to this instruction upon 
the ground that the use of the words '4but it does require 
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the elimination of all danger or hazard which the exer-
cise of reasonable care could remove or guard against, 
and this applies to the condition with which we are con-
cerned" amounts to a co1nment by the court that the 
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care (R. 208). 
While the general language of this charge properly 
instructs the jury, the ap.plication of a specific portion 
of the charge to the condition in question amounted to 
a directed verdict against defendant on the issue of its 
negligence. The court probably intended to instruct the 
jury that the condition in question was to be considered 
in light of the entire charge. However, this is not the 
effect of the language used. The charge instructs the 
jury that the defendant is not required to absolutely 
eliminate all danger or hazard but must require the 
elimination of all danger or hazard which the exercise of 
reasonable care could remove or guard against, and this 
applies to the condition with 'Yhich we are concerned. The 
use of the co-ordinate conjunction ''but" followed by the 
use of the pronoun "this" brings home to the jury that 
the condition involved in the case is one which the Rail-
road Company was required to eliminate. 
The language of this instruction fun1ished the an-
swer for the jury on the issue of the defendant's negli-
gence. It could not have been more prejudicial had the 
court specifically instructed the jury that the defendant 
was guilty of negligence as a matter of la,v. The specific 
portion of this charge is not cured by the general lan-
guage. This court has held that the specific portion of 
the charge controls and that 'vhere the JUry can only 
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bl) confused by an application of the specific to the 
general, the court must reverse for a new trial. St,ate v. 
Jlcndrick~, 123 Utah 2G7, 258 P. 2d 452; Jensen v. Utah 
llail1ray CuHlpany, 73 Utah 356, 270 Pac. 349; Heywood 
v. The Denver and RiJo G11ande Western Railroad Cam-
pa ny, 6 lTtah :2<1 155, 307 P. 2d 1045; State v. Waid, 92 
rtah 297, ti7 P. 2d G-17. We submit that this error is so 
glaring that no extended argument is necessary to demon-
strate either the fact of error or its prejudicial nature. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COM~llTTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GI\TING INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
''rHICli IN SUBSTANCE AND E F FE C T 
_A_lTTHORIZED RECOVERY BY THE PLAIN-
TIFF E\TEN THOUGH HIS NEGLIGENCE 
WAS THE SOLE ·CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT 
~\XD E\rEN THOUGH DEFENDANIT'S NEGLI-
GEXCE '\rAs NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
By Instruction No. 16 the court charged the jury 
as follows: 
'"You are instructed that before you can re-
turn a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant in this case you must find from a 
preponderance of the evidence the following prop-
ositions to be true: 
1. That the defendant knew, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable care should have known that 
there was an unsecured coil of wire located on 
a post in its shop at the time and place alleged. 
2. That the defendant knew, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable care should have known that 
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the presence of said coil of wire on said post at 
said time and place constituted an unreasonable 
hazard to employees working in said shop, as-
suming that the said employees would handle 
said wire with ordinary and reasonable care. 
3. That the plaintiff in attempting to re-
move said coil of wire from said post sustained 
the injuries for which he makes claim, or that said 
injuries were not solely caused by the negligence 
of the plaintiff. 
In the event you find the foregoing proposi-
tion to be true, then you will return a verdict in 
favor of plaintiff and against the defendant and 
assess damages in the manner set out in Instruc-
tion Nos. 14 and 17. 
In the event you find that the injuries were 
solely caused by the negligence of the plaintiff 
or that the defendant was not neglgent, you must 
return a verdict in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action." 
Due exception to said instruction was taken by defend-
ant's counsel (R. 208, 209). 
Instruction No. 16 is similar to defendant's requested 
instruction No. 6 except that defendant's requested in-
struction required that the jury find both that the plain-
tiff sustained injury in removing the coil of 'vire on the 
post and that the injuries were not solely caused by the 
negligence of the plaintiff. The instruction given by the 
court authorized the jury to return a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff if the jury found either that the plaintiff 
""as injured in removing the coil of wire or that the negli-
gence of the plaintiff was not the sole cause of the 
accident. The court also added a paragraph not con-
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tained in defendant's request to the effect that the jury 
,,·a::; authorized to return a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant if they found the indi-
cated propositions to be true. 
The instruction authorized recovery in the absence 
of a finding of proximate cause. For example, if the 
jury found that plaintiff was not guilty of negligence 
'rhich was the sole cause of the accident, they were 
authorized to return a verdict for plaintiff even though 
they should also find that the plaintiff was not injured 
in re1noving the wire from the post as he claimed. On 
the other hand, if the jury found that the plaintiff was 
injured in removing the wire from the post, they were 
authorized to return a verdict for the plaintiff even 
though plaintiff's injuries were the sole cause of the 
accident. 
We submit that the instruction is manifestly erron-
eous and prejudicial and requires the reve~rsal of this 
case. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COlTRT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUC'TION NO. 
6 IN\TOLVING AN ISSUE NOT PRESENTED 
BY THE PLEADINGS OR THE EVIDENICE 
AND NOT BEFORE THE COURT OR THE 
JURY. 
By Instruction No. 6 given at plaintiff's request 
the court charged the jury, inter alia (R. 44): 
"Any such employee shall not be held to have 
assumed the risks of his employment occasioned 
by such negligence." 
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Exceptions were duly taken upon the ground that 
the instruction ,vas immaterial to any issue before the 
court and jury and prejudicial to the defendant (R. 208). 
The defendant did not assert the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk as a defense. Defendant offered no instruc-
tions and no argument for the proposition that plaintiff 
was barred from recovery because he must be held to have 
assumed certain risks. There was absolutely nothing in 
the pleadings or the evidence or in the other instruc-
tions of the court that would in any 'vay intimate that 
assumption of risk was in issue. 
In the case of Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 
142 P. 2d 649, this court held that an instruction on 
assumed risk should not have been given 'Yhere it 'Yas 
not raised as an issue. There the court held that the 
defendant had not been prejudiced by the instruction 
since it was negligent in other respects as a matter of 
law. However, it 'Yas clearly pointed out that it is in 
no case proper to instruct a jury on abstract issues of 
law. Riding v. Roylance, 63 Utah 221, 224 Pac. 2S5. Later 
in the case of Moore v. D. & R. G., -± Utah 2d 255, 292 
P. 2d 849, the Supreme Court considered a similar in-
struction. In that case the court reversed and remanded 
for a ne'Y trial. The decision, though holding it unneces-
sary to determine whether the instruction on assumed 
risk 'vas reversible error, decided that said instruction 
was "improper and should not be given in the ne'v trial.'' 
The effect of the instruction is to eonvey to the mind 
of a juror that the law favors the injured " ... orlanan over 
his e1nployer. Where, as here, the doctrine of assruned 
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risk is not explained to the jury, the instruction can only 
confuse and 1nislead. A juror might well wonder why 
the court is instructing on this prop·osi tion. More likely 
the juror n1ight try to apply it to the issues which are 
aetually raised. If a jury attempted to apply it either to 
the issue of plaintiff's negligence or defendant's contri-
butory negligence, the possibility of misapplication of 
the la\Y is apparent. 
\ v· e think that under the facts of this case the decision 
of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Ellis v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., 1-l-8 Neb. 515, 27 N.W. 2d 921, is controlling. In 
that case, where a similar instruction on assumption of 
risk "ras given, the court said: 
"Assumption of risk is an affirmative de-
fense. In the case at bar it was not made an issue 
either by the pleadings or the evidence. There-
fore it had no relation to the issues in the case and 
should not have been given." 
l~nder the facts of the Ellis case the improper in-
struction was held prejudicial error. 
The court should settle the proposition in this case so 
that this strawman may not continually rise in F.E.L.A. 
cases to confuse and mislead juries in favor of the em-
ployee. We submit that the error here was prejudicial. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DE-
FEXDANT'S REQUESIT·ED INSTRU,CTIONS 
NOS. 6 AND 11 WHICH WOULD HAVE. DI-
RECTED THE JURY THAT IN D·ETERMIN-
IXG WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT 
W.A.S NEGLIGENT THEY SHOULD TAKE IN-
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TO CO·NSIDERATION THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD THE RIGHT TO ASS·UME THAT ITS 
EMPLOYEES WOULD EXERCISE REASON-
ABLE CARE FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY. 
Defendant's requested instructions Nos. 6 and 11 
proposed charges to the jury to the effect that the defen-
dant was entitled to assume that its employees would 
exercise reasonable care for their own safety (R. 28, 33). 
Defendant took exception to the failure of the court to 
give these proposed instructions (R. 207). 
As already pointed out under Point I, the defendant 
had no duty to anticipate that the plaintiff would jerk or 
pull the wire from the post. If there had been such a 
duty to foresee negligence on the part of its employees 
plaintiff could argue that the jury was authorized to 
conclude that the roll of wire should have been bound 
so that when employees negligently and carelessly jerked 
it about it could not inflict injury. It was of vital import-
ance to the defendant to get a clear picture before the 
jury as to defendant's duty to plaintiff. 
The point of the defendant's case was that defend-
ant could not reasonably be expected to foresee the injury 
which occurred here; that the plaintiff """as negligent 
and that the defendant had no duty to foresee the plain-
tiff's neglect. Although there are instructions in this case 
defining negligence and instructions defining the duty 
to furnish a reasonably safe place to work (R. 45), there 
is nowhere found in these instructions the important 
proposition that the defendant """as not required to fore-
see negligence on the part of the plaintiff. We submit 
that the failure of the court to instruct on this proposition 
constituted prejudicial error. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
POINT VII. 
1\ GROSS AWARD OF $30,000 FOR PLAIN-
TIFF'S ALLEGED INJURY IS SO EX·CES-
SI\~~~ UNDER THE CIRCUMSTAN·CES OF 
THIS CASE AS ITO CO~MPEL THE CONCLU-
SION THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED 
BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE IN ASSESS-
ING DA:\lAGES AND THE TRIAL ·COURT 
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DE-
~YING DE.FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL BY REASON OF EXCESSIVE 
DAMAGES. 
The jury assessed plaintiff's damages at $30,000 and 
cut the award by $7,500 by reason of the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff. 
Siciliano was 61 years of age at the time of the trial. 
He lost about seven weeks of work as a result of the ac-
cident (R. 107). Other than this loss of time his eye injury 
did not prevent him from working steadily and he was 
~till working full time when the case was tried (R. 108). 
The full use of his eye is not lost. 
From a monetary standpoint, the financial loss to 
Siciliano does not exceed $560. ( R. 106, 107). 
We submit that the evidence cannot justify a ve·rdict 
which assesses plaintiff's damages at $30,000. That 
amount is over five ( 5) times the average annual income 
of Siciliano. At present insurance rates, $30,000 would 
provide Siciliano at 61 years of age with more than $2,200 
per year annual income or $180 monthly income for the 
rest of his life (Insurance ·Co. of North America, Rate 
Book.) Invested at 6 percent, $30,000 \vould yield ap-
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proximately $150 income per month and still preserve 
the entire principal. 
Whether the damages in any instance are excessive, 
must, of course, be determined in accordance with the 
p·eculiar facts and circumstances of each use. Under the 
facts of the case at bar we think that it is manifest that 
the ve·rdict of the jury was influenced by sympathy, pas-
sion and prejudice and that the verdict below should not 
be allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
It is most respectfully submitted that the defendant 
was not guilty of any actionable negligence which con-
tributed to plaintiff's injuries; and that the plaintiff's 
negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The case 
should be remanded to the district court with instructions 
to vacate the judgment below and enter judgment in favor 
of ~the defendant. Further, we respectfully submit that 
the trial court erred in excusing jurors from the panel; 
in its instructions to the jury and in denying defendant's 
motion for a new trial and that the damages awarded 
were so excessive that the judgment below should be set 
aside. In the event the cause is not remanded with in-
structions to dismiss, "\Ve submit that defendant should be 
granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\:rAN C01TT, BAGLE.Y, CORN\VALL 
& McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., 
Counsel for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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